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Hi Benoit,
You are right confined users are not allowed to get attributes of all files and directories. They are given permissions to files with the base_file_type and similar attributes, and the to parent directories types when rules for particular objects are in place, for example
systemd_read_unit_files(user_t)
expands to (among other rules)
allow user_t systemd_unit_file_type:dir list_dir_perms;
allow user_t systemd_unit_file_type:file read_file_perms
Do you think there is a problem with that?
By the way, it does not apply only in mls, but also in targeted.
Hi Zdenek, happy to see you here :D
The only issue here, and for customer, is that they can't see directly see the permissions of directories in /var with staff_t, and for them it appears to be an "uneccessary restriction".
Effectively, is there a security reason to avoid access to staff_t user to getattr such dir ?
Thanks!
Benoit
By default, unprivileged users are allowed get only file attributes of directories with the type which is in the base_file_type SELinux attribute. My concern was there potentially could be an information leak when the mls policy is actually used, but it turned out not to be the case.
Since the problem described in this bug report should be
resolved in a recent advisory, it has been closed with a
resolution of ERRATA.
For information on the advisory (selinux-policy bug fix and enhancement update), and where to find the updated
files, follow the link below.
If the solution does not work for you, open a new bug report.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2023:7091