More information about this security flaw is available in the following bug: http://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2263092 Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process.
Use the following template to for the 'fedpkg update' request to submit an update for this issue as it contains the top-level parent bug(s) as well as this tracking bug. This will ensure that all associated bugs get updated when new packages are pushed to stable. ===== # bugfix, security, enhancement, newpackage (required) type=security # low, medium, high, urgent (required) severity=medium # testing, stable request=testing # Bug numbers: 1234,9876 bugs=2263092,2263104 # Description of your update notes=Security fix for [PUT CVEs HERE] # Enable request automation based on the stable/unstable karma thresholds autokarma=True stable_karma=3 unstable_karma=-3 # Automatically close bugs when this marked as stable close_bugs=True # Suggest that users restart after update suggest_reboot=False ====== Additionally, you may opt to use the bodhi web interface to submit updates: https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/new
Fedora 39 and 40 use the system libgit2, so they can punt to bug 2263101 without further consideration. While cargo in Fedora 38 does bundle libgit2, my opinion is that this flaw is not a security issue for cargo. You can get cargo->libgit2 to hang with a malicious git ref in Cargo.toml, but this is considered a trusted context.