Description of problem:
I recently tried signing an RPM with a subkey of my main GPG key. It worked,
but not in the way that I would have expected. Now when I gave my uid in the
%_gpg_name macro, it did pick the subkey to sign with automatically. (This may
have been due to the fact that this was the only signing subkey.) When I looked
at the RPM file using "rpm -qip", it showed the RPM as having been signed by the
subkey, which is what I would expect. Namely, the last 8 hex-characters of the
Key ID field were the last 8 hex-characters of the GPG fingerprint of the
subkey. However, the version of the GPG key in the RPM database was the same as
the fingerprint of the parent key. That also makes sense, as that is how one
has to handle the key in general. Even though they displayed different key
fingerprints, the RPM would verify correctly. But there was no indication that
the two were part of the same key. Perhaps the RPM should indicate that it was
signed using key x which is a subkey of key y.
See http://fortytwo.ch/gpg/subkeys for a description of why multiple subkeys are
Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
Steps to Reproduce:
1.Make a brand new GPG key that can sign.
2.Add a signing subkey to this GPG key.
3.Add the uid of this key to the %_gpg_name macro in your .rpmmacros file.
4.Import the parent key (including the subkey) using rpm --import.
5.Sign an RPM file using this subkey.
When you look at the RPM using "rpm -qip _rpm_filename_", you see the
fingerprint for the subkey, but nothing indicating the parent key. When you run
"rpm -q gpg-pubkey", you see the fingerprint for the parent key, but nothing
indicating the subkey.
I would hope to see some kind of linkage between the parent key and the subkey.
There are 2 elements needed to support signining subkeys:
1) adding the signining subkey fingerprint to the Pubkeys index so that the key is found.
2) Verifying the signature that binds the subkey to the primary key.
If you can export the signing subkey as an armored pubkey certificate, then
its likely that rpm --import and signature verification will just work. Whether
that is a wise or proper certificate is a whole different matter.
User firstname.lastname@example.org's account has been closed
Reassigning to owner after bugzilla made a mess, sorry about the noise...
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This bug is open for a Fedora version that is no longer maintained and
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Thank you for reporting this bug and we are sorry it could not be fixed.
Reopening as this is a feature that is needed for supporting offline master keys. The master keys should not be used for anything else than subkey and peer key signatures and revocations.
Fixed upstream as a173d781a631a92524ce5be364c679ba19b3e321
Rpm always imported whole gpg keys including subkeys because rpm stores whole unparsed key data (key, subkeys, signatures of keys...) in gpg-pubkey... packages. These data are parsed during loading keys from db into rpm keyring in the beginning of rpm transaction but previously only main keys was extracted from these data and they were inserted into rpm keyring. Now also all subkeys are parsed and inserted into keyring. That means now you can have rpm package signed with arbitrary subkey and rpm is able to verify the sign of this package.
This change is in rpm-4.12.90 (a.k.a. rpm-4.13.0-alpha) which is in fedora rawhide.