The bufprint routine used by capi_cmsg2str does an unbounded vsprintf into a
8192 byte buffer, perhaps hoping it's big enough.
If the content of that vsprintf can be controlled by remote peers, this may lead
to a remote security hole for daemons using CAPI (pppd-capi-plugin,
asterisk-chan-capi, capi4hylafax, ...). Or a DoS.
If the content of that vsprintf can be controlled by local users making use of a
system service (such as sending a fax, making a phone call, ...) that uses CAPI,
this is a privilege escalation or remote authenticated user security hole, or a DoS.
Created attachment 151860 [details]
BZ 230563 RHEL 2.1AS patch, only compilation tested, need to test with real hardware
Created attachment 151862 [details]
CVS repository patch, adds CONFIG_CAPI_TRACE option
if it is possible, i would like not to post it, because i can not guarantee that
code is working. All code in patches is not tested. For example, when user will
use patched module, it can cause kernel panic so it is better not to include it?
Plesae correct me if i am wrong.
An advisory has been issued which should help the problem
described in this bug report. This report is therefore being
closed with a resolution of ERRATA. For more information
on the solution and/or where to find the updated files,
please follow the link below. You may reopen this bug report
if the solution does not work for you.
*** Bug 402751 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***