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Bug 234295 - CVE-2007-1353 Bluetooth setsockopt() information leaks
CVE-2007-1353 Bluetooth setsockopt() information leaks
Product: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 2.1
Classification: Red Hat
Component: kernel (Show other bugs)
i386 Linux
medium Severity low
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Assigned To: Don Howard
Martin Jenner
: Security
Depends On:
  Show dependency treegraph
Reported: 2007-03-28 05:22 EDT by Marcel Holtmann
Modified: 2007-11-30 17:06 EST (History)
1 user (show)

See Also:
Fixed In Version: RHSA-2007-0672
Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Story Points: ---
Clone Of:
Last Closed: 2007-08-08 14:16:55 EDT
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Regression: ---
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Documentation: ---
Verified Versions:
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oVirt Team: ---
RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: ---

Attachments (Terms of Use)

External Trackers
Tracker ID Priority Status Summary Last Updated
Red Hat Product Errata RHSA-2007:0672 normal SHIPPED_LIVE Important: kernel security update 2007-08-08 14:16:35 EDT

  None (edit)
Description Marcel Holtmann 2007-03-28 05:22:16 EDT
Report from Ilja van Sprundel:

The Bluetooth L2CAP setsockopt code has a small information leak. Basically
there is a case where 32 bits of kernel stack memory can get leaked to userland
in l2cap_sock_setsockopt():

static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int optlen)
 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 struct l2cap_options opts;
 switch (optname) {
  len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(opts), optlen); <-- len can be 0 !!!
  if (copy_from_user((char *) &opts, optval, len)) { <-- no data copied
   err = -EFAULT;
  l2cap_pi(sk)->imtu  = opts.imtu; <-- uninit 
  l2cap_pi(sk)->omtu  = opts.omtu; <-- uninit

So optlen can be 0, so no data is copied into opts, and so whatever is on the
stack at that point will get put in the sk struct. You could use getsockopt() to
retrieve that leaked data. 

Seems the hci_sock_setsockopt() function has a very simular information leak in
the HCI_FILTER case: 

  len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(uf)); <-- can be 0
  if (copy_from_user(&uf, optval, len)) { <-- no data copied 

So uf remains uninit. A call to getsockopt can retrieved the leaked info.
Comment 4 Red Hat Bugzilla 2007-08-08 14:16:55 EDT
An advisory has been issued which should help the problem
described in this bug report. This report is therefore being
closed with a resolution of ERRATA. For more information
on the solution and/or where to find the updated files,
please follow the link below. You may reopen this bug report
if the solution does not work for you.


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