In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf, sockmap: Check for any of tcp_bpf_prots when cloning a listener

A listening socket linked to a sockmap has its sk_prot overridden. It
points to one of the struct proto variants in tcp_bpf_prots. The variant
depends on the socket's family and which sockmap programs are attached.

A child socket cloned from a TCP listener initially inherits their sk_prot.
But before cloning is finished, we restore the child's proto to the
listener's original non-tcp_bpf_prots one. This happens in
tcp_create_openreq_child -> tcp_bpf_clone.

Today, in tcp_bpf_clone we detect if the child's proto should be restored
by checking only for the TCP_BPF_BASE proto variant. This is not
correct. The sk_prot of listening socket linked to a sockmap can point to
to any variant in tcp_bpf_prots.

If the listeners sk_prot happens to be not the TCP_BPF_BASE variant, then
the child socket unintentionally is left if the inherited sk_prot by
tcp_bpf_clone.

This leads to issues like infinite recursion on close [1], because the
child state is otherwise not set up for use with tcp_bpf_prot operations.

Adjust the check in tcp_bpf_clone to detect all of tcp_bpf_prots variants.

Note that it wouldn't be sufficient to check the socket state when
overriding the sk_prot in tcp_bpf_update_proto in order to always use the
TCP_BPF_BASE variant for listening sockets. Since commit
b8b8315e39ff ("bpf, sockmap: Remove unhash handler for BPF sockmap usage")
it is possible for a socket to transition to TCP_LISTEN state while already
linked to a sockmap, e.g. connect() -> insert into map ->
connect(AF_UNSPEC) -> listen().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/