Bug 243259 (CVE-2007-1353) - CVE-2007-1353 Bluetooth setsockopt() information leaks
Summary: CVE-2007-1353 Bluetooth setsockopt() information leaks
Keywords:
Status: CLOSED ERRATA
Alias: CVE-2007-1353
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
low
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Jason Baron
QA Contact: Martin Jenner
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2007-06-08 10:16 UTC by Marcel Holtmann
Modified: 2021-11-08 15:56 UTC (History)
5 users (show)

Fixed In Version: RHSA-2007-0488
Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed: 2007-06-25 18:05:41 UTC
Embargoed:


Attachments (Terms of Use)


Links
System ID Private Priority Status Summary Last Updated
Red Hat Product Errata RHSA-2007:0488 0 normal SHIPPED_LIVE Important: kernel security update 2008-01-09 18:29:42 UTC

Description Marcel Holtmann 2007-06-08 10:16:06 UTC
Report from Ilja van Sprundel:

The Bluetooth L2CAP setsockopt code has a small information leak. Basically
there is a case where 32 bits of kernel stack memory can get leaked to userland
in l2cap_sock_setsockopt():

static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 struct l2cap_options opts;
...
 switch (optname) {
 case L2CAP_OPTIONS:
  len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(opts), optlen); <-- len can be 0 !!!
  if (copy_from_user((char *) &opts, optval, len)) { <-- no data copied
   err = -EFAULT;
   break;
  }
  l2cap_pi(sk)->imtu  = opts.imtu; <-- uninit 
  l2cap_pi(sk)->omtu  = opts.omtu; <-- uninit
  break;
...
}

So optlen can be 0, so no data is copied into opts, and so whatever is on the
stack at that point will get put in the sk struct. You could use getsockopt() to
retrieve that leaked data. 

Seems the hci_sock_setsockopt() function has a very simular information leak in
the HCI_FILTER case: 

 case HCI_FILTER:
  len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(uf)); <-- can be 0
  if (copy_from_user(&uf, optval, len)) { <-- no data copied 

So uf remains uninit. A call to getsockopt can retrieved the leaked info.

Comment 1 Jason Baron 2007-06-12 15:48:52 UTC
committed in stream rhel‑4.5.z build 55.0.1


Comment 4 Red Hat Bugzilla 2007-06-25 18:05:42 UTC
An advisory has been issued which should help the problem
described in this bug report. This report is therefore being
closed with a resolution of ERRATA. For more information
on the solution and/or where to find the updated files,
please follow the link below. You may reopen this bug report
if the solution does not work for you.

http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2007-0488.html



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