In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix NULL pointer dereference in ceph_mds_auth_match()

The CephFS kernel client has regression starting from 6.18-rc1.
We have issue in ceph_mds_auth_match() if fs_name == NULL:

    const char fs_name = mdsc->fsc->mount_options->mds_namespace;
    ...
    if (auth->match.fs_name && strcmp(auth->match.fs_name, fs_name)) {
            / fsname mismatch, try next one */
            return 0;
    }

Patrick Donnelly suggested that: In summary, we should definitely start
decoding `fs_name` from the MDSMap and do strict authorizations checks
against it. Note that the `-o mds_namespace=foo` should only be used for
selecting the file system to mount and nothing else. It's possible
no mds_namespace is specified but the kernel will mount the only
file system that exists which may have name "foo".

This patch reworks ceph_mdsmap_decode() and namespace_equals() with
the goal of supporting the suggested concept. Now struct ceph_mdsmap
contains m_fs_name field that receives copy of extracted FS name
by ceph_extract_encoded_string(). For the case of "old" CephFS file
systems, it is used "cephfs" name.

[ idryomov: replace redundant %*pE with %s in ceph_mdsmap_decode(),
  get rid of a series of strlen() calls in ceph_namespace_match(),
  drop changes to namespace_equals() body to avoid treating empty
  mds_namespace as equal, drop changes to ceph_mdsc_handle_fsmap()
  as namespace_equals() isn't an equivalent substitution there ]