AI_ONLY_REPORT
package: mrtg-2.17.10-12.el10
------
Summary: Symlink-based arbitrary file clobber/chown via --pid-file when run  
as root in daemon mode: MRTG creates and `chown`s the PID file before  
dropping privileges, allowing an attacker who can influence or pre-place  
the PID path to make root follow a symlink and transfer ownership of an  
arbitrary existing file to the daemon user; the accompanying `create_pid()`  
logic also carries limited TOCTOU / non-existent-target clobber risk.
Requirements to exploit: The attacker needs local low-privileged access on  
the target and a deployment where MRTG is started as root with `--daemon`  
and later drops privileges to another user. The attacker must be able to  
influence the PID file path, control the config-derived PID path, or  
pre-place a symlink at that path in a writable location before startup.  
This issue is not remotely reachable, and starts that already execute MRTG  
as an unprivileged user do not expose the root-side `chown` primitive.
Component affected: MRTG daemon startup logic in `bin/mrtg.socket6` and  
`lib/mrtg2/MRTG_lib.pm` (the same pre-drop PID-file logic is also present  
in `bin/mrtg`)
Version affected: 2.17.10-12.el10 (confirmed in the available source  
checkout). The full upstream introduction range is unknown from the  
available history; in the local clone, the pre-drop `create_pid()` +  
`chown` block is present from commit `2ca68627078a..HEAD`, while the unsafe  
`create_pid()` pattern is present from base commit `767bce1636bc..HEAD`.
Patch available: no
Version fixed (if any already): unknown
Upstream coordination: Not yet notified. The source material includes a  
draft disclosure email to the MRTG maintainers.
CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - 7.1 (HIGH)
AV:L - Local access to the affected host is required.
AC:L - Once MRTG is started as root in an affected daemon deployment and  
the attacker can control or pre-place the PID path, exploitation is  
straightforward.
PR:L - Low privileges are needed to control a writable PID path or plant  
the symlink in affected setups.
UI:N - No additional user interaction is required after the vulnerable  
service start.
S:U  - The vulnerable code and impacted files are within the same  
operating-system security scope.
C:H  - Ownership takeover of a sensitive file can expose data that  
should remain root-only.
I:H  - Ownership takeover of a sensitive file can allow direct  
modification and privilege escalation.
A:N  - The primary demonstrated primitive is file ownership takeover;  
direct availability impact is secondary and configuration-dependent.
Impact: Important. In affected root-start daemon deployments, this is a  
local privilege-escalation / file-ownership-takeover issue: a  
low-privileged local attacker who can influence or pre-place the PID file  
path can make root `chown` an arbitrary existing file to the daemon user  
before privileges are dropped. The issue is narrower than a generic local  
root exploit because it depends on root-started daemon mode and attacker  
control over the PID path, but the resulting confidentiality and integrity  
impact can still be high.
Embargo: yes
Reason: This is a plausible local privilege-escalation issue in a  
supported daemon-start path, and no upstream fix is known from the source  
material. Coordinated disclosure is preferable so PID-file handling can be  
corrected before publication.
Acknowledgement: Aisle Research
Steps to reproduce:
1. Prepare a root-owned target file and a symlinked PID path:
```bash
sudo rm -f /tmp/mrtg.pid /tmp/owned_by_root
sudo touch /tmp/owned_by_root
sudo chown root:root /tmp/owned_by_root
ln -s /tmp/owned_by_root /tmp/mrtg.pid
```
2. Start MRTG as root in daemon mode, dropping privileges:
```bash
sudo /usr/bin/mrtg --daemon --pid-file=/tmp/mrtg.pid --user=nobody  
/etc/mrtg/mrtg.cfg
```
3. Verify ownership of the symlink target changed:
```bash
ls -l /tmp/owned_by_root
```
4. Expected result: the target file becomes owned by `nobody` (or the  
selected drop user/group), confirming that root followed the symlink during  
the pre-drop `chown`.
Mitigation:
Do not start MRTG as root with `--daemon` unless it is strictly  
necessary; prefer starting it directly as the intended service user.

Do not place the PID file in attacker-writable locations and do not allow  
untrusted users to influence `--pid-file` or the config-derived PID path.

Keep any PID-file directory root-owned and not writable by unprivileged  
users if root startup is unavoidable.

Refuse symlinks for PID files and create them securely with `sysopen(...,  
O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644)` or equivalent.

Prefer creating the PID file only after privileges have been dropped.


Vulnerability details:
```perl
bin/mrtg.socket6
if (defined $opts{"daemon"}) {

Create a pidfile, then chown it so we can use it once we change user
     &create_pid($pidfile);
     chown $uid, $gid, $pidfile;
}


($(,$)) = ($gid,$gid);
($<,$>) = ($uid,$uid);
```
```perl
lib/mrtg2/MRTG_lib.pm
sub create_pid ($) {
     my $pidfile = shift;
     return if ($OS eq 'NT' );
     return if -e $pidfile;
     if ( open(PIDFILE,">$pidfile")) {
          close PIDFILE;
     }
}
```


The most reliable demonstrated primitive is symlink-following `chown` on an  
existing target file. The `create_pid()` `-e`/`open(">...")` sequence is  
still unsafe and introduces TOCTOU / non-existent-target clobber risk, but  
direct clobber of an already existing file is not the primary demonstrated  
behavior because of the `-e` guard.
Most relevant CWEs:
CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access

CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use race condition


Proposed fix:
```diff
diff --git a/bin/mrtg.socket6 b/bin/mrtg.socket6
@@
   if (defined $opts{"daemon"}) {

       # Create a pidfile, then chown it so we can use it once we change  
user

       &create_pid($pidfile);

       chown $uid, $gid, $pidfile;

   }
+    # Do not create/chown pidfile as root on user-influenced path.


diff --git a/bin/mrtg b/bin/mrtg
@@
   if (defined $opts{"daemon"}) {

       # Create a pidfile, then chown it so we can use it once we change  
user

       &create_pid($pidfile);

       chown $uid, $gid, $pidfile;

   }
+    # Do not create/chown pidfile as root on user-influenced path.


diff --git a/lib/mrtg2/MRTG_lib.pm b/lib/mrtg2/MRTG_lib.pm
@@
+use Fcntl qw(O_WRONLY O_CREAT O_EXCL);
@@
sub create_pid ($) {
my $pidfile = shift;
return if ($OS eq 'NT' );
   return if -e $pidfile;

   if ( open(PIDFILE,">$pidfile")) {

        close PIDFILE;

   } else {

        warn "cannot write to $pidfile: $!\n";

   }
+    if (lstat($pidfile)) {
+         die "Refusing symlink pid file: $pidfile\n" if -l _;
+         return;
+    }
+    sysopen(my $fh, $pidfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644)
+         or die "cannot securely create pid file $pidfile: $!\n";
+    close($fh) or die "cannot close pid file $pidfile: $!\n";
  }
```


------
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