+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #243204 +++
Description of problem:
The logging of failed logins can be used to inject bad information into audit
ssh -l "fakeuser auid=1234 tty=pty1 host=127.0.0.1" victim
type=USER_AUTH msg=audit(06/07/2007 11:04:14.429:101) : user pid=8151 uid=root
auid=unset subj=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 msg='PAM: authentication
acct=fakeuser auid=unknown(1234) tty=pty1 host=127.0.0.1 : exe=/usr/sbin/sshd
(hostname=discovery.redhat.com, addr=192.168.1.171, terminal=ssh res=failed)'
Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
all recent versions
-- Additional comment from firstname.lastname@example.org on 2007-06-08 15:10 EST --
ssh -l "fakeuser auid=1234 terminal=pty1 hostname=127.0.0.1" victim
Is a better test case. Using it, you can subvert ausearch and aureport when they
search or report on tty or hostname. This is important in that some people could
construct protective measures based on the audit log information and wind up
suspecting the wrong host. Its easy to image this become a DoS vector. And it
would possibly make people lose confidence in audit system.
-- Additional comment from email@example.com on 2007-06-15 09:19 EST --
This issue has security implications as a third party may rely on parsing the
audit logs (like a IDS/IPS system) and this false information may be able to
fool it. allocated CVE-2007-3102
-- Additional comment from firstname.lastname@example.org on 2007-06-22 17:18 EST --
Because it was problematic to change from using audit_log_user_message() we've
decided to implement the escaping directly in the pam package so the audit
library change is not necessary anymore.
An advisory has been issued which should help the problem
described in this bug report. This report is therefore being
closed with a resolution of ERRATA. For more information
on the solution and/or where to find the updated files,
please follow the link below. You may reopen this bug report
if the solution does not work for you.