The OpenShift Router does not validate backend destinations resolved from FQDN-typed EndpointSlices. A user with EndpointSlice write access can create a Service backed by an FQDN EndpointSlice pointing to a hostname that resolves to 169.254.169.254 (e.g. 169-254-169-254.nip.io), then create a Route targeting that Service. The router proxies requests to the cloud metadata endpoint, allowing the attacker to retrieve instance credentials and other sensitive metadata. This bypasses the fix for CVE-2021-25737, which only validates IPv4/IPv6 addresses via ValidateEndpointIP() but not FQDN endpoints. IMDSv2 does not mitigate this because HAProxy runs as a hostNetwork process at Layer 7 and can perform the PUT/GET token exchange. This attack requires the IngressController to use HostNetwork endpoint publishing (default on bare metal/UPI, not on cloud providers).