Bug 2495203 - CVE-2026-54512 jetty: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass [fedora-all]
Summary: CVE-2026-54512 jetty: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via Polymorp...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: None
Product: Fedora
Classification: Fedora
Component: jetty
Version: rawhide
Hardware: Unspecified
OS: Unspecified
high
high
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Mat Booth
QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance
URL:
Whiteboard: {"flaws": ["f81b3481-0d9d-48dd-9087-c...
Depends On:
Blocks: CVE-2026-54512
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-06-30 20:48 UTC by Jon Moroney
Modified: 2026-06-30 20:48 UTC (History)
5 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed:
Type: ---
Embargoed:


Attachments (Terms of Use)

Description Jon Moroney 2026-06-30 20:48:19 UTC
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process.

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.


Note You need to log in before you can comment on or make changes to this bug.