[This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.]
XAPI can configure different users with different roles, using Role
Based Access Control.  For more details, see:

  https://docs.xenserver.com/en-us/xencenter/current-release/rbac-overview.html#rbac-roles

The pool-admin role is fully privileged.  Notably, users with this role
can also SSH into the host as root.

The other administrator roles are pool-operator, vm-power-admin and
vm-admin, each of which are authorised to configure and manage various
aspects of the system.

Some settings are inadequately restricted, and can be set by a lower
privilege of administrator than expected.

 * CVE-2026-23559: A vm-admin can set VBD.other_config:backend-local and
   turn arbitrary files in dom0 into VDIs (virtual disks) and give said
   disks to a VM they control.  This is an arbitrary read and/or modify
   of files in dom0.

 * CVE-2026-23560: A vm-admin can set VM.other-config:is_system_domain
   and mark a VM as a system domain.  System domains are ignored and
   left running during certain other host/pool operations, and may be
   hidden from view in tooling.

 * CVE-2026-23561: A vm-admin can set VM.other_config:storage_driver_domain
   and mark a VM as the storage domain for a particular host storage
   connection (PBD). Shutting down the VM can cause the PBD to be
   erroneously marked as unplugged when it is not.

 * CVE-2026-23562: Configuration of PCI passthrough is normally
   restricted to the pool-admin role.  However one API was missing this
   check, allowing a vm-admin access to unintended host hardware.

 * CVE-2026-42486: A vm-admin can set the VM.platform:hvm_serial
   parameter, which should be restricted to the pool-admin role, as it
   can allow arbitrary dom0 file write.