In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()

svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once
before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every
point in the loop.

In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of
at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX
modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX].  But the
CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming
ACK with any request the port actually sent.  Once port->partner is set,
an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally.  A broken
or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to
ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra
Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs.  Because the pre-loop check passes,
the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[].  For
mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the
partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen
SVID/VDO bytes.

Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed
past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner
supplies or how the function was reached.