In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async

[Why&How]
dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a
16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which
is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this
results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.

Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without
bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.

Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when
payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds
check for link_index before it is used.

(cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881)