In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array

aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size
struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array:

	int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count);
	...
	for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) {
		struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i;
		...
		lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix);

pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a
fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the
on-disk pp_count.  pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from
the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016
drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up
to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds).

The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device
with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied
image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned by udev), via
msdos_partition() -> aix_partition().

Clamp the scan to the number of entries the ppe[] array can hold.