In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop

The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by
(pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len.
When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte
remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop
reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer.

Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE
to the handler functions.

Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
  1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header).
  2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len.

Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length
for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above.