In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame length before ingress parsing

When ingress deaggregation is disabled, rmnet_map_ingress_handler() passes
the skb straight to __rmnet_map_ingress_handler(), skipping the length
validation that rmnet_map_deaggregate() performs on the aggregated path.
The parser then dereferences the MAP header and csum header/trailer based on
the on-wire pkt_len without checking skb->len, so a short frame is read out
of bounds:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801118ed00 by task exploit/147
  Call Trace:
   ...
   rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_map_data.c:413)
   __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:96)
   rmnet_rx_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:129)
   __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6089)
   netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6460)
   tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955)
   tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2001)
   vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688)
   ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
   ...

Factor that validation out of rmnet_map_deaggregate() into
rmnet_map_validate_packet_len() and run it on the no-aggregation path too.
The MAP header is bounds-checked first, since this path can receive a frame
shorter than the header.