In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: bpa10x: avoid OOB read of revision string in bpa10x_setup()

bpa10x_setup() sends the vendor command 0xfc0e and passes the response
to bt_dev_info() and hci_set_fw_info() as a "%s" string starting at
skb->data + 1, without checking the length:

	bt_dev_info(hdev, "%s", (char *)(skb->data + 1));
	hci_set_fw_info(hdev, "%s", skb->data + 1);

A device that returns a one-byte response (status only) leaves
skb->data + 1 past the end of the data, and the %s walk reads adjacent
slab memory until it meets a NUL. The same happens when the payload is
not NUL-terminated within skb->len. The out-of-bounds bytes end up in
the kernel log and the firmware-info debugfs file.

Print the revision string with a bounded "%.*s" limited to skb->len - 1
instead. This keeps the string readable for well-behaved devices while
never reading past the received data, and does not fail setup, so a
device returning a short or unterminated response keeps working.