In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/ntfs3: bound DeleteIndexEntryAllocation memmove length

In do_action()'s DeleteIndexEntryAllocation case, e->size comes
from an on-disk INDEX_BUFFER entry.  When e->size makes
e + e->size point past hdr + hdr->used,
PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) returns a negative ptrdiff_t
that is silently cast to a quasi-infinite size_t when passed
to memmove().  The memmove then walks past the destination
buffer.

The sibling DeleteIndexEntryRoot case at fslog.c:3540-3543
already carries the corresponding guard:

	if (PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) < esize ||
	    Add2Ptr(e, esize) > Add2Ptr(lrh, rec_len) ||
	    used + esize > le32_to_cpu(hdr->total)) {
		goto dirty_vol;
	}

Apply the same shape to the allocation-path case.  Also reject
esize == 0: memmove(e, e, ...) is a no-op and leaves
hdr->used unchanged, hiding a malformed entry from the
existing check_index_header() walk.

Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 by
mounting a crafted NTFS image: the unguarded memmove takes a
length of 0xffffffffffffff00 and the kernel oopses in
memmove+0x81/0x1a0 on the do_action+0x36a2 frame.

[almaz.alexandrovich: clang-formatted the changes]