In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: fix stack buffer overflow in multichannel session-key copy

Commit 4b706360ffb7 ("ksmbd: fix multichannel binding and enforce channel
limit") moved the binding-path session key out of the session-wide
sess->sess_key (CIFS_KEY_SIZE = 40) into a new per-channel buffer, and
sized both that buffer and the on-stack copy used during binding with
SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE (16):

	struct channel {
		char	sess_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE];	/* 16 */
		...
	};

	ntlm_authenticate() / krb5_authenticate():
		char channel_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE] = {};	/* 16 */
		char *auth_key = conn->binding ? channel_key : sess->sess_key;

The two writers that fill this destination still bound the copy length
against CIFS_KEY_SIZE (40), not against the 16-byte buffer:

	ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() (NTLM key exchange):
		if (sess_key_len > CIFS_KEY_SIZE)	/* 40 */
			return -EINVAL;
		arc4_crypt(ctx_arc4, sess_key,
			   (char *)authblob + sess_key_off, sess_key_len);

	ksmbd_krb5_authenticate():
		if (resp->session_key_len > sizeof(sess->sess_key))	/* 40 */
			...
		memcpy(sess_key, resp->payload, resp->session_key_len);

On a binding SESSION_SETUP, auth_key points at the 16-byte channel_key,
so a client that supplies an NTLM EncryptedRandomSessionKey of up to 40
bytes (with NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH), or a Kerberos ticket whose
session key is longer than 16 bytes (a normal AES256 key is 32), writes
past the 16-byte stack buffer -- up to a 24-byte kernel stack overflow.
KASAN reports it as a stack-out-of-bounds write in arc4_crypt() called
from ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob().

The destinations must be able to hold the full session key the length
checks already permit. Size the per-channel key buffer and the two
on-stack channel_key buffers with CIFS_KEY_SIZE, matching sess->sess_key.