In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

geneve: gate GRO hint in geneve_gro_complete() on gs->gro_hint

geneve_gro_receive() reads the GRO hint through geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(),
which honours it only when the socket enabled IFLA_GENEVE_GRO_HINT
(gs->gro_hint). geneve_gro_complete() instead calls the low-level
geneve_opt_gro_hint_off() and acts on the hint unconditionally.

On a tunnel without the hint, receive aggregates the frames as plain
ETH_P_TEB while complete still honours an attacker-supplied hint option: it
inflates gh_len by gro_hint->nested_hdr_len (u8) and redirects the dispatch
type, so the inner gro_complete handler runs at nhoff + gh_len, an offset
receive never pulled nor validated, reading out of bounds of the skb head:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196)
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800fe91980 by task exploit/153
   ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196)
   geneve_gro_complete (drivers/net/geneve.c:965)
   udp_gro_complete (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:940)
   inet_gro_complete (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1621)
   __gro_flush (net/core/gro.c:306)

Gate the complete path on gs->gro_hint too via geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(), so
both paths agree. Tunnels that enable the hint are unaffected.