In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

alloc_tag: fix use-after-free in /proc/allocinfo after module unload

allocinfo_start() only reinitializes the codetag iterator at position 0. 
For subsequent reads (position > 0), it reuses cached iterator state from
the previous batch.  allocinfo_stop() drops mod_lock between read batches,
which allows module unload to complete and free the module memory that the
cached iterator still references:

  CPU0 (read)                        CPU1 (rmmod)
  ----                               ----
  allocinfo_start(pos=0)
    down_read(mod_lock)
    allocinfo_show()
    ...
  allocinfo_stop()
    up_read(mod_lock)
                                     codetag_unload_module()
                                       kfree(cmod)
                                       release_module_tags()
                                     ...
                                     free_mod_mem()
  allocinfo_start(pos=N)
    down_read(mod_lock)
    // reuses cached iter, skips re-init
  allocinfo_show()
    ct->filename   <-- UAF

After free_mod_mem() frees the module's .rodata, allocinfo_show()
dereferences ct->filename, ct->function which point there.

Save the iterator state in allocinfo_next() and resume from it in
allocinfo_start() with codetag_next_ct(), which detects module removal via
idr_find() returning NULL and skips to the next module.