In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer

iscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types
into the fixed-size conn->data buffer, which is allocated for
ISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes.  For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP,
REJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU
whose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer.

The SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its
data segment (sense/response data) into conn->data via
iscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check.  The
only upstream bound on in.datalen is conn->max_recv_dlength, the
initiator's advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly
negotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144).  A target
that returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and
max_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn->data buffer.

Once the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly
like those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn->data
when present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data.  Fold the
opcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check.