In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: usb-audio: fix stack info leak in RME Digiface status

snd_rme_digiface_read_status() reads a four-word status block from the
device into an uninitialised on-stack __le32 buf[4] and, whenever the
vendor control-IN transfer does not return a negative error, copies all
four words into the caller's status[].

snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full requested size back into the caller's
buffer regardless of how many bytes the data stage actually delivered:

	buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL);
	err = usb_control_msg(dev, pipe, request, requesttype,
			      value, index, buf, size, timeout);
	memcpy(data, buf, size);

usb_control_msg() returns the transferred length on a short control-IN,
which is a non-negative value, and writes only that many bytes.  The
remainder of the copy back is the kmemdup()ed image of the caller's
buffer, so a device answering with a short data stage leaves the
trailing words of buf[] holding leftover kernel stack.  The only guard
in the caller is err < 0, so those words are stored into status[].

They then reach user space: snd_rme_digiface_get_status_val() selects a
16-bit halfword of status[] per the control's reg/mask, and the eight
Digiface status controls together expose the whole 16-byte frame to an
unprivileged reader of /dev/snd/controlC*.

Zero-initialise the buffer so a short read yields zeros instead of stack
residue.  This mirrors snd_rme_get_status1(), which already clears its
output word before the same kind of vendor read.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee>