Bug 2519412 (CVE-2026-72889) - CVE-2026-72889 Net-OAuth: Net::OAuth: Authentication bypass via chosen signature algorithm
Summary: CVE-2026-72889 Net-OAuth: Net::OAuth: Authentication bypass via chosen signat...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-72889
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
urgent
urgent
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On: 2529748
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-08-19 07:32 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-09-08 11:49 UTC (History)
0 users

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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-08-19 07:32:01 UTC
Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.

verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.

A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.


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