Bug 2525429 (CVE-2026-80602) - CVE-2026-80602 kernel: perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage
Summary: CVE-2026-80602 kernel: perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-80602
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-08-28 07:44 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-08-31 13:37 UTC (History)
2 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed:
Embargoed:


Attachments (Terms of Use)

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-08-28 07:44:32 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage

A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET
entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel.

E.g.

  $ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \
        perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
        perf script -i - -F brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \
        grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}'

  ...
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
  ...

The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege
level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to
also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any
branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped
when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested.


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