A vulnerability exists in the BusyBox TLS implementation in networking/tls.c. The get_finished() function contains a TODO comment and never actually verifies the verify_data field against the expected handshake transcript hash. Per RFC 5246 Section 7.4.9, the Finished message contains a PRF output computed over the entire handshake transcript, and both client and server must verify this value to confirm no handshake messages were tampered with in transit.

Because BusyBox unconditionally accepts any verify_data payload, a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept TLS handshake messages can modify cipher suite negotiation, inject parameters, or downgrade the connection without either endpoint detecting the tampering. This was validated by building a modified BusyBox ssl_server that sends corrupted verify_data. BusyBox ssl_client completed the handshake without error, while OpenSSL correctly rejected it.

This finding is directly analogous to CVE-2014-0224 (OpenSSL CCS Injection), which carried the same CVSS vector and score.