In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: reject a tree connect response whose byte count is too small

CIFSTCon() bounds its strnlen() over the byte area with the server's
ByteCount minus two, which for ByteCount 0 or 1 goes negative as an int
and converts to a huge size_t.  The later subtraction wraps the __u16
bytes_left, and that is what bounds cifs_strndup_from_utf16(): a bound of
up to 65535 against a ~16 KB cifs_req_poolp object runs off the end of the
slab object, and the bytes reach userspace through tcon->nativeFileSystem
in /proc/fs/cifs/DebugData.

Reject a byte area too small for what the parser consumes.  Two bytes is
the least it can consume, and no conformant response carries fewer.  The
new trace point is the 129th smb_eio_trace entry, which __mode(byte)
cannot represent, so the attribute goes with it.