In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: don't free session slots that are still in use

nfsd4_sequence() can free the very slot it is currently processing.
When the session shrinker has reduced se_target_maxslots below
se_fchannel.maxreqs, the shrink path checks three conditions before
calling free_session_slots():

  1. se_target_maxslots < maxreqs  (shrink was advertised)
  2. slot->sl_generation == se_slot_gen  (slot is up-to-date)
  3. seq->maxslots <= se_target_maxslots  (client acknowledges)

However, seq->slotid is never checked against se_target_maxslots.
A client using a slot in the range [se_target_maxslots, maxreqs) can
satisfy all three conditions: its slot has the current generation
(set by a prior SEQUENCE), and it sends sa_highest_slotid <=
se_target_maxslots to acknowledge the reduction.

free_session_slots() then kfrees every slot at index >=
se_target_maxslots, including the caller's own slot. The function
continues to write sl_seqid, sl_flags, sl_generation, and stores the
dangling pointer in cstate->slot. Later, nfsd4_store_cache_entry()
copies up to maxresp_cached bytes of the compound reply into the freed
sl_data[] array, corrupting whatever slab object now occupies that
address.

Additionally, a concurrent thread processing SEQUENCE on a different
high-numbered slot can have its slot freed out from under it.
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is set under nn->client_lock before the lock is
released, so any concurrent thread past SEQUENCE will have its slot
marked. However, free_session_slots() does not check NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE
before freeing.

Fix both problems by:
 1. Checking that the current request's slotid is below the shrink
    boundary.
 2. Scanning slots in the to-be-freed range for NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE and
    deferring the shrink if any are active.