In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read

In qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and
shrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len:

	if (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) {
		sense_data += rsp_info_len;
		par_sense_len -= rsp_info_len;
	}

rsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target's FCP
response (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area
size (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target
reporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned
subtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of
bounds.

The underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in
qla2x00_handle_sense():

	if (sense_len > par_sense_len)
		sense_len = par_sense_len;
	memcpy(cp->sense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len);

so the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the
out-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap
memory into the command's sense buffer.

Clamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so
par_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB
data area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both
qla2x00_handle_sense() call sites.