Bug 2538720 (CVE-2026-89407) - CVE-2026-89407 com.fasterxml.jackson/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: Jackson-core: Denial of Service via regular expression backtracking
Summary: CVE-2026-89407 com.fasterxml.jackson/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-89407
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On: 2542919 2542920 2542921 2542923 2542924 2542927
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-09-22 20:09 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-09-29 05:38 UTC (History)
154 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-09-22 20:09:28 UTC
NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run. 



Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length. 



An attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float). 



Because StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex. 



Testing by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool. 



The affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected. 



The fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan.


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