In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bootconfig: Fix integer overflow in initrd size check

Sashiko reported that in get_boot_config_from_initrd(), a crafted initrd
with a huge bootconfig size (such as 0xFFFFFFFF) can cause the pointer
arithmetic:

    data = ((void *)hdr) - size;

to wrap around on 32-bit systems (or when pointer subtraction overflows).
Because data wraps around, the subsequent bounds check:

    if ((unsigned long)data < initrd_start)

evaluates to false, bypassing the check. The kernel then calls
xbc_calc_checksum(data, size), which attempts to read 4GB of memory,
hitting unmapped pages and triggering a fatal kernel page fault during
early boot. Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, an
unbounded 32-bit size can similarly bypass the initrd_start check.

Fix this by:
1. Ensuring the initrd is at least large enough to contain the bootconfig
   footer and verifying hdr is within the initrd bounds.
2. Checking that size does not exceed XBC_DATA_MAX and does not exceed
   the available space between initrd_start and hdr before performing
   pointer subtraction.