In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix heap overflow in DACL owner/group rewrite

When id_mode_to_cifs_acl rewrites an existing DACL, it allocates a
buffer sized according to the on-disk DACL length reported by
dacl_ptr->size. However, replace_sids_and_copy_aces may rewrite each
ACE with a new owner/group SID obtained from the cifs.idmap upcall.
Those SIDs can have up to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15) sub-authorities,
making each ACE up to 76 bytes (sizeof(struct smb_ace)).

If the original DACL contains short SIDs (e.g., 1 sub-authority) while
the replacement SIDs are long, the rewritten ACEs overflow the
allocation.

Fix this by always budgeting for worst-case SID expansion: allocate
sizeof(struct smb_acl) plus num_aces * sizeof(struct smb_ace), which
covers the smb_acl header and room for every ACE at maximum SID size.
This replaces the previous split logic that used dacl_ptr->size for
cifsacl mounts but num_aces * sizeof(struct smb_ace) for mode_from_sid
mounts: both paths can trigger the same rewrite and need the same
headroom.

KASAN reports this as:
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in build_sec_desc+0x1e8a/0x2680 [cifs]
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881a5e25374 by task chown/5298
  ...
  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
   allocated 884-byte region [ffff8881a5e25000, ffff8881a5e25374)