The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)
that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a
container, the coordinator:

1. **fork()s** a child process
2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root
   filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)
4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving
   the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted
   capability set**
5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability
   set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**
6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with
   `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from
   `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**
7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()`
   — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount
   namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**

The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor
container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

## Affected Code

### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`

```rust
// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
        .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
```

```rust
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
    debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}
```

### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`

```go
// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
    out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    return string(out), nil
}
```

### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)

**File:** `version_executable.rs`

```rust
// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
    fpr_kind_executable,
    out_dir.to_string(),
    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);
```