Bug 2546575 - CVE-2026-53939 cjose: OpenIDC/cjose uses all-zero Content Encryption Key for AES-CBC-HMAC JWE encryption [fedora-all]
Summary: CVE-2026-53939 cjose: OpenIDC/cjose uses all-zero Content Encryption Key for ...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: None
Product: Fedora
Classification: Fedora
Component: cjose
Version: rawhide
Hardware: Unspecified
OS: Unspecified
urgent
urgent
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Tomas Halman
QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance
URL:
Whiteboard: {"flaws": ["9f911a67-804c-45d2-baf2-d...
Depends On:
Blocks: CVE-2026-53939
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-10-06 12:26 UTC by aedmond
Modified: 2026-10-06 12:26 UTC (History)
1 user (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed:
Type: ---
Embargoed:


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Description aedmond 2026-10-06 12:26:23 UTC
Disclaimer: Community trackers are created by Red Hat Product Security team on a best effort basis. Package maintainers are required to ascertain if the flaw indeed affects their package, before starting the update process.

OpenIDC/cjose is a C library implementing the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE). In versions 0.6.1 through 0.6.2.5, when cjose encrypts a JWE using an AES-CBC-HMAC content-encryption algorithm (`A128CBC-HS256`, `A192CBC-HS384`, or `A256CBC-HS512`) together with any key-management algorithm that generates a fresh content-encryption key (CEK), the CEK is all zero bytes instead of being randomly generated. The resulting JWE is therefore encrypted and authenticated under a fixed, publicly known key, so anyone who obtains the JWE can recover the plaintext and forge or modify the content. This is fixed in version 0.6.2.6 by `_cjose_jwe_set_cek_aes_cbc()` generating the CEK from `RAND_bytes`. A regression test asserts that the `encrypted_key` differs across two encryptions for each AES-CBC-HMAC variant. Until upgrading, for data encrypted with cjose, three options are available. Use an AES-GCM `enc` (`A128GCM` / `A192GCM` / `A256GCM`) instead of an AES-CBC-HMAC `enc`,  use `alg=dir` with a caller-supplied CEK, or avoid using cjose for JWE encryption with the affected algorithm pair. These are mitigations for new ciphertexts only; data already encrypted under the zero key remains compromised and should be re-encrypted (and any secrets it contained rotated).


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