A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. The repository auto-prune policy endpoint (GET on /api/v1/repository/<namespace>/<repository>/autoprunepolicy/<policy_uuid>) resolves the policy using the repository name and policy UUID only, without scoping to the authorized namespace. Because repository names are not globally unique (every namespace may have a repository with the same name), a user who is admin of a repository named X in their own namespace can read the auto-prune policy of a repository named X in another namespace by supplying that policy's UUID. The vulnerability is in data/model/autoprune.py in the get_repository_autoprune_policy_by_uuid function, which queries by Repository.name and UUID but never joins to the User table to enforce namespace scoping. The sibling function get_repository_autoprune_policies_by_repo_name correctly scopes by namespace. The PUT and DELETE methods for the same resource are not affected because their model queries are namespace-scoped. Exploitation requires knowledge of the victim policy's random v4 UUID and a repository with a matching name. The leaked data is limited to low-sensitivity policy configuration (prune method, value, tag pattern).