In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

thunderbolt: Reject oversized XDomain properties responses

tb_xdp_properties_request() allocates room for 45 data dwords in its
252-byte response buffer.  The XDomain length field is six bits wide,
however, and a malicious peer can set it to 63.  After the fixed response
fields are subtracted, the driver treats this as 48 data dwords.

Commit 322e93448d90 ("thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to
allocation size") only bounds the copy against data_len.  If data_len is
at least 48, memcpy() reads 192 bytes from the 180-byte res->data array,
causing a 12-byte heap out-of-bounds read.  Commit 4db2bd2ed478
("thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size") limits
the earlier copy but does not constrain this header-derived length.

Reject response data lengths that exceed the allocated source buffer
before copying them into the assembled property block.