In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: xen/scsifront: Check for a NULL shadow entry on a backend response

scsifront_do_response() validates the rqid in a backend response against
VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS before using it to index info->shadow[], but then
dereferences the entry to test ->inflight without checking that the slot
is populated.  Shadow slots are NULL before a command is submitted (the
host private area is zeroed at allocation) and are reset to NULL in
_scsifront_put_rqid() once a request completes, so an in-range rqid that
does not correspond to an outstanding request makes the frontend
dereference a NULL pointer.

A malicious or buggy backend can thus crash the guest by returning a
response whose rqid is in range but not in flight -- for example a
spurious response before any command has been issued, or a duplicate of
one already completed.  The ring has only VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS (16) slots,
so before the first command every in-range rqid selects a NULL slot.

Reject a response whose shadow slot is not populated.