Bug 2572256 - liblxi: source signature does not verify with openpgpverify (SHA-1 key self-signatures)
Summary: liblxi: source signature does not verify with openpgpverify (SHA-1 key self-s...
Keywords:
Status: ASSIGNED
Alias: None
Product: Fedora
Classification: Fedora
Component: liblxi
Version: rawhide
Hardware: Unspecified
OS: Unspecified
unspecified
unspecified
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Robert Scheck
QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks: openpgpverify-migration
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-11-12 08:34 UTC by Jakub Jelen
Modified: 2026-11-15 18:30 UTC (History)
1 user (show)

Fixed In Version:
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Github lxi-tools liblxi issues 59 0 None open Source signature does not verify with openpgpverify (SHA-1 key self-signatures) 2026-11-15 18:30:39 UTC

Description Jakub Jelen 2026-11-12 08:34:40 UTC
As part of the Fedora 45 Change Sequoia openpgpverify (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Sequoia_openpgpverify), %gpgverify (GnuPG) is being replaced by %openpgpverify (Sequoia sqv). For liblxi, the switch can't be done in a simple PR: %gpgverify accepts the current upstream signature, but %openpgpverify rejects it.

Failing check (dist-git commit 6fcd8311f114):

    %openpgpverify --keyring=101BAC1C15B216DBE07A3EEA2BDB4A0944FA00B1 --signature=liblxi-1.22.tar.xz.asc --data=liblxi-1.22.tar.xz

    Signing key on 101BAC1C15B216DBE07A3EEA2BDB4A0944FA00B1 is not bound:
               No binding signature at time 2024-11-08T18:30:19Z
      because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance
      because: SHA1 is not considered secure
    0 of 1 signatures are valid (threshold is: 1).
    openpgpverify: Signature verification failed.

Why:

The release signature (SHA-512, made 2024-11-08) is by the key 101BAC1C15B216DBE07A3EEA2BDB4A0944FA00B1 (RSA 4096 bits). sqv reports only the first problem it hits (above). All the problems found:

- The self-signatures that bind the key's user IDs to it use only SHA-1. SHA-1 is no longer considered secure: collisions have been practical since 2017 (SHAttered) and chosen-prefix collisions since 2020 (SHA-1 is a Shambles), and the crypto policy rejects it. GnuPG doesn't check self-signatures; Sequoia does, and without a valid one it doesn't use the key at all.

The copy of the key on keys.openpgp.org, keyserver.ubuntu.com and WKD has the same problems.

What can be done:

- Ask upstream to refresh the key's self-signatures with SHA-256 and publish the updated key (keys.openpgp.org, WKD or the project website):

      gpg --cert-digest-algo SHA256 --quick-set-expire FPR 2030-12-31
      gpg --cert-digest-algo SHA256 --quick-set-expire FPR 2030-12-31 '*'

  Use an absolute expiry date (or 0). Releases signed after this verify.
- For the release already in Fedora, ask upstream to sign the same tarball again with the updated key and publish the new signature (the tarball doesn't change), or wait for the next release. Then update the keyring and the signature in dist-git.
- If upstream already signs with a newer key, switch the keyring to that key.
- Only if re-signing is not an option, upstream (only the key owner can do this) can date the new self-signatures one second after the key (or its newest subkey) was created, so that the existing release signatures verify too. Backdating is unusual and easy to get wrong, so it is a last resort; Updating GPG keys for Fedora and RHEL (https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/updating-gpg-keys-for-fedora-and-rhel) describes how (gpg --faked-system-time "$((CT + 1))!" --cert-digest-algo SHA256 --quick-set-expire ..., with CT that creation time).
- If upstream doesn't respond, the package can keep %gpgverify for now; nothing breaks until it is removed.

The rest of the conversion is mechanical. Once the signature or key is sorted out, the spec change is the same as for other packages: %{gpgverify} → %{openpgpverify} and BuildRequires: openpgpverify. I'm happy to send the PR.

(The check was run with scripts from https://github.com/Jakuje/openpgpverify-migration.)

Comment 1 Robert Scheck 2026-11-15 18:30:40 UTC
Forwarded to upstream: https://github.com/lxi-tools/liblxi/issues/59


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