Bug 2572284 - signify: source signature does not verify with openpgpverify (signing key algorithm rejected)
Summary: signify: source signature does not verify with openpgpverify (signing key alg...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: None
Product: Fedora
Classification: Fedora
Component: signify
Version: rawhide
Hardware: Unspecified
OS: Unspecified
unspecified
unspecified
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Marcus Müller
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks: openpgpverify-migration
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-11-12 08:46 UTC by Jakub Jelen
Modified: 2026-11-12 23:49 UTC (History)
3 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
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Type: ---
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System ID Private Priority Status Summary Last Updated
Codeberg aperezdc signify issues 1 0 None None None 2026-11-12 23:49:35 UTC

Description Jakub Jelen 2026-11-12 08:46:22 UTC
As part of the Fedora 45 Change Sequoia openpgpverify (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Sequoia_openpgpverify), %gpgverify (GnuPG) is being replaced by %openpgpverify (Sequoia sqv). For signify, the switch can't be done in a simple PR: %gpgverify accepts the current upstream signature, but %openpgpverify rejects it.

Failing check (dist-git commit e46c3261132b):

    %openpgpverify --keyring=5AA3BC334FD7E3369E7C77B291C559DBE4C9123B --signature=signify-33.tar.xz.asc --data=signify-33.tar.xz

    Signing key on 5AA3BC334FD7E3369E7C77B291C559DBE4C9123B is not bound:
               Policy rejected asymmetric algorithm
      because: DSA1024 is not considered secure
    0 of 1 signatures are valid (threshold is: 1).
    openpgpverify: Signature verification failed.

Why:

The release signature (SHA-256, made 2026-05-11) is by the key 5AA3BC334FD7E3369E7C77B291C559DBE4C9123B (DSA 1024 bits). sqv reports only the first problem it hits (above). All the problems found:

- The key is DSA-1024. DSA keys and RSA keys shorter than 2048 bits are no longer considered secure, and the crypto policy rejects them.
- The key expired on 2021-06-11, before the release was signed on 2026-05-11, according to the keyring in dist-git. GnuPG ignores expiry; Sequoia checks that the key was valid when the signature was made.

The copy of the key on keys.openpgp.org, keyserver.ubuntu.com and WKD is newer, but its problems remain: key algorithm rejected by the crypto policy.

What can be done:

- Ask upstream to create a new key (for example Ed25519 or RSA 3072+), publish it, and sign releases with it using SHA-256 or better. Then switch the keyring to it.
- Until then the package can keep %gpgverify, or verify the tarball differently (for example against a checksum published over HTTPS).

The rest of the conversion is mechanical. Once the signature or key is sorted out, the spec change is the same as for other packages: %{gpgverify} → %{openpgpverify} and BuildRequires: openpgpverify. I'm happy to send the PR.

(The check was run with scripts from https://github.com/Jakuje/openpgpverify-migration.)

Comment 1 Marcus Müller 2026-11-12 13:18:28 UTC
Reported upstream; https://codeberg.org/aperezdc/signify/issues/1


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