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As part of the Fedora 45 Change Sequoia openpgpverify (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Sequoia_openpgpverify), %gpgverify (GnuPG) is being replaced by %openpgpverify (Sequoia sqv). For tmispell-voikko, the switch can't be done in a simple PR: %gpgverify accepts the current upstream signature, but %openpgpverify rejects it. Failing check (dist-git commit 5cc6b90bc93d): %openpgpverify --keyring=gpgkey-AC5D65F10C8596D7E2DAE2633D309B604AE3942E.gpg --signature=tmispell-voikko-0.7.1.tar.gz.asc --data=tmispell-voikko-0.7.1.tar.gz Signing key on AC5D65F10C8596D7E2DAE2633D309B604AE3942E is not bound: No binding signature at time 2013-08-28T16:05:03Z because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance because: SHA1 is not considered secure 0 of 1 signatures are valid (threshold is: 1). openpgpverify: Signature verification failed. Why: The release signature (SHA-1, made 2013-08-28) is by the key AC5D65F10C8596D7E2DAE2633D309B604AE3942E (RSA 4096 bits). sqv reports only the first problem it hits (above). All the problems found: - The self-signatures that bind the key's user IDs to it use only SHA-1. SHA-1 is no longer considered secure: collisions have been practical since 2017 (SHAttered) and chosen-prefix collisions since 2020 (SHA-1 is a Shambles), and the crypto policy rejects it. GnuPG doesn't check self-signatures; Sequoia does, and without a valid one it doesn't use the key at all. - The release signature itself uses SHA-1 too; for signatures over data, this won't be relaxed. The copy of the key on keys.openpgp.org, keyserver.ubuntu.com and WKD has the same problems. What can be done: - Ask upstream to refresh the key's self-signatures with SHA-256 and publish the updated key (keys.openpgp.org, WKD or the project website): gpg --cert-digest-algo SHA256 --quick-set-expire FPR 2030-12-31 gpg --cert-digest-algo SHA256 --quick-set-expire FPR 2030-12-31 '*' Use an absolute expiry date (or 0). A new SHA-256 release signature alone still fails while the key is only bound with SHA-1. - Then ask upstream to sign releases with SHA-256 (gpg --digest-algo SHA256, or personal-digest-preferences SHA256 in gpg.conf): the current release again, or the next one. Then update the keyring and the signature in dist-git. - If upstream already signs with a newer key, ask them to use SHA-256 with it and switch the keyring to that key. - Until then the package can keep %gpgverify, or verify the tarball differently (for example against a checksum published over HTTPS). The rest of the conversion is mechanical. Once the signature or key is sorted out, the spec change is the same as for other packages: %{gpgverify} → %{openpgpverify} and BuildRequires: openpgpverify. I'm happy to send the PR. (The check was run with scripts from https://github.com/Jakuje/openpgpverify-migration.)