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BufFileRawSkip() in libXfont accepts a signed int count parameter but does not validate it for negative values. A crafted PCF font file can supply a table offset that, when subtracted from the current file position in pcfSeekToType(), wraps to a negative value due to unsigned to signed integer conversion. The negative count passes the in-buffer bounds check in BufFileRawSkip() (curoff + count <= fileoff is trivially true when count is negative) and advances the buffer pointer backward past the buffer start. Subsequent FontFileGetc() calls then dereference the corrupted buffer pointer, reading from invalid heap memory or unmapped pages. An attacker who can cause the X server or any application using libXfont to load a malicious PCF font file can trigger an out-of-bounds heap read, potentially leaking sensitive information from the process memory space via QueryFont responses, or crash the process via a segmentation fault. Fixed in: libXfont2-2.0.10 Fixes: - https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/commit/TBD Acknowledgements: Elias Myllymki working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative * Patch From f9f25c0c5d1f60ebcdcf9f83fa57bf0ec6cc9a20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer> Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 15:53:12 +1000 Subject: [PATCH libXfont 1/2] bufio,pcf: reject negative skip count in BufFileRawSkip MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit BufFileRawSkip() takes a signed int count but never validates it for negative values. A crafted PCF font file can have a table offset that, when subtracted from the current file position, wraps to a negative value. This negative count passes the buffer bounds check (curoff + count <= fileoff is trivially true for negative count) and moves the buffer pointer backward past the buffer start. Subsequent FontFileGetc() calls then read from invalid memory, causing an out-of-bounds heap read or a segmentation fault. Add validation in BufFileRawSkip() to reject negative count values, returning BUFFILEEOF. Additionally, add defense-in-depth checks in pcfSeekToType() to validate that the skip distance fits in an int and that the position is non-negative before calling FontFileSkip. This vulnerability was discovered by: Elias Myllymki working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative CVE-2026-109909, ZDI-CAN-33183 Assisted-by: AI #+begin_src diff --- src/bitmap/pcfread.c | 4 +++- src/fontfile/bufio.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git ./src/bitmap/pcfread.c ../src/bitmap/pcfread.c index a385331e1d48..e3b6277e1ed5 100644 --- ./src/bitmap/pcfread.c +++ ../src/bitmap/pcfread.c @@ -203,17 +203,19 @@ pcfGetCompressedMetric(FontFilePtr file, CARD32 format, xCharInfo *metric) static Bool pcfSeekToType(FontFilePtr file, PCFTablePtr tables, int ntables, CARD32 type, CARD32 *formatp, CARD32 *sizep) { int i; for (i = 0; i < ntables; i++) if (tables[i].type == type) { - if (position > tables[i].offset) + if (position < 0 || (CARD32)position > tables[i].offset) + return FALSE; + if (tables[i].offset - (CARD32)position > INT_MAX) return FALSE; if (!FontFileSkip(file, tables[i].offset - position)) return FALSE; position = tables[i].offset; *sizep = tables[i].size; *formatp = tables[i].format; return TRUE; } diff --git ./src/fontfile/bufio.c ../src/fontfile/bufio.c index 7465f72cbfe3..8b081e9bf595 100644 --- ./src/fontfile/bufio.c +++ ../src/fontfile/bufio.c @@ -82,16 +82,19 @@ BufFileRawFill (BufFilePtr f) static int BufFileRawSkip (BufFilePtr f, int count) { off_t curoff; off_t fileoff; off_t todo; + if (count < 0) + return BUFFILEEOF; + curoff = f->bufp - f->buffer; fileoff = curoff + f->left; if (curoff + count <= fileoff) { f->bufp += count; f->left -= count; } else { todo = count - (fileoff - curoff); if (lseek (FileDes(f), todo, SEEK_CUR) == -1) { -- 2.56.0 #+end_src