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Privately reported via the Product Security support portal (reported 2026-11-09; reporter requested coordinated disclosure, nothing public as of creation). Independently confirmed by Red Hat on tnef-1.4.18-17.fc44 and on a build of the upstream 1.4.12 tag. In mapi_attr_read() (src/mapi_attr.c), the MAPI property value count num_values is read from the TNEF input with only a 4-byte readability check (CHECKINT32, util.h) and is used as the element count of CHECKED_XCALLOC(MAPI_Value, num_values) in alloc_mapi_values(). No bound ties the count to the attribute buffer length, and alloc_limit defaults to 0 (set only by the non-default --maxsize/-x option). A 37-byte crafted TNEF file with num_values=0x20000000 drives a 12,884,905,984-byte allocation request (0x20000000 * sizeof(MAPI_Value)=24, plus allocator header, page-aligned). Observed impact: allocation failure (ulimit -v, overcommit_memory=2, capped address space) aborts via assert(v) at mapi_attr.c:255 (SIGABRT, exit 134); num_values=0 triggers the same assert deterministically with no allocation at all (alloc_mapi_values returns NULL for a zero count - reachable assert, CWE-617) with no environmental prerequisite; when the allocation succeeds, xcalloc's memset touches the entire region (measured: 1,574,484 KB max RSS for a 1.5 GiB request on the Fedora RPM build), so memory-capped deployments are OOM-killed; on tnef 1.4.12 (no assert, unguarded value loop) allocation failure is a NULL-pointer write at mapi_attr.c:308 (SIGSEGV, gdb-confirmed from coredump) and a successful allocation leads to an out-of-bounds crash at mapi_attr.c:317; on 32-bit builds the count*size multiplication overflows size_t and check_mul_overflow aborts immediately. The num_properties field at the same site is an unbounded twin. Present in the 1.4.18 tag and at upstream HEAD 8b43e8b (2026-11-03); not fixed upstream. tnef is not shipped in RHEL; exposure is the Fedora/community stream.