Bug 2576814 (CVE-2026-99558) - CVE-2026-99558 kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via uninitialized key eviction in blk-crypto
Summary: CVE-2026-99558 kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via uninitialized key evicti...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-99558
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-11-19 15:34 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-11-19 20:17 UTC (History)
17 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 15:34:02 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key()

Sashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the
following flow:

  dm-inlinecrypt ctor            # first use of the fallback
   ├─ blk_crypto_init_key()      # succeeds, ctx->key.size != 0
   ├─ blk_crypto_start_using_key()
   │   ├─ hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP
   │   │    # profile never allocated (NULL)
   │   └─ raw key: fallback_start_using_mode()
   │      └─ blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails
   │         └─ kfree(profile)   # not NULLed
   ├─ goto bad
   └─ inlinecrypt_dtr()          # evicts whenever key.size is set
      └─ blk_crypto_evict_key()
         └─ blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false
            └─ blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key()
               └─ __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile)
                  └─ profile->num_slots # BOOM!!!

This issue can be reproduced using the following commands:

  dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64
  LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing)
  SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP)
  KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')
  dmsetup create ic --table "0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \
    $KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped"

And the following oops is triggered:

  ==================================================================
  blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
        0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f]
  CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
  RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0
  Call Trace:
   blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320
   inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160
   inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0
   dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40
   table_load+0x1c4/0x490
   ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0
   dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20
  ==================================================================

dm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never
started, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it.

Fix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when
tfms_inited[] is not set for the key's mode.  tfms_inited[] is only set
after blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the
profile, so the crash above is no longer reachable.

The bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae ("blk-crypto:
dynamically allocate fallback profile") was merged in v6.5, and only
became actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 ("dm-inlinecrypt:
add target for inline block device encryption") was merged in v7.2.


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