Bug 2576861 (CVE-2026-99450) - CVE-2026-99450 kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via use-after-free in nvgrace-gpu VFIO driver
Summary: CVE-2026-99450 kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via use-after-free in nvgrac...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-99450
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-11-19 15:36 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-11-19 19:20 UTC (History)
17 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed:
Embargoed:


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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-19 15:36:55 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vfio/nvgrace-gpu: Use a core-only open_device in fallback mode

When the ACPI memory properties are missing or the C2C link is down, the
device is exposed through nvgrace_gpu_pci_core_ops.  That table opens
through nvgrace_gpu_open_device() but closes through
vfio_pci_core_close_device(), so open and close are not symmetric.

nvgrace_gpu_open_device() registers nvdev->usemem for poison handling
unconditionally.  In fallback mode usemem.memlength is zero, and
register_pfn_address_space() inserts a node covering [0, ULONG_MAX].
Nothing removes it: a second open fails with -EBUSY, and once the device
is unbound the node outlives the nvdev that contains it.  The next open
after a rebind reports:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800894aa30 by task nvgrace_repro/203
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
   print_report+0x153/0x4c6
   kasan_report+0xe4/0x1a0
   interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310
   register_pfn_address_space+0x97/0x100
   nvgrace_gpu_open_device+0x21c/0x730
   vfio_df_open+0x213/0x520
   vfio_df_ioctl_bind_iommufd+0x3e8/0x6e0
   vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x782/0x1570
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13c/0x1c0
   do_syscall_64+0x106/0x630
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   </TASK>

  Allocated by task 188:
   ...
   _vfio_alloc_device+0x3a/0x500
   nvgrace_gpu_probe+0xcb/0x660
   local_pci_probe+0xcf/0x170
   ...

  Freed by task 188:
   ...
   kfree+0x20d/0x600
   device_release+0xcf/0x250
   kobject_put+0x152/0x2f0
   pci_device_remove+0xb0/0x1c0
   device_release_driver_internal+0x38d/0x540
   unbind_store+0xde/0x100
   ...

Give the fallback table its own open_device that only calls
vfio_pci_core_enable() and vfio_pci_core_finish_enable(), the
counterpart of vfio_pci_core_close_device().  Fallback mode then never
touches the nvgrace memory regions, as Alex suggested.

This should be safe because the fallback table uses the vfio-pci core
read, write and mmap handlers, so nothing there uses the state
nvgrace_gpu_open_device() sets up.  The one visible difference is that a
fallback open no longer fails when BAR0 cannot be mapped, which matches
vfio-pci.


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