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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: pin owning modules for open debugfs files The OCFS2 debugfs file operation tables do not set owner. The full debugfs proxy obtains real_fops with fops_get() at open and keeps it until final release. Without an owner, this does not acquire a reference to the module containing the table and its callbacks. Removing the debugfs entries does not drain retained open files. An open connected_nodes file can therefore outlive ocfs2_nodemanager and make full_proxy_release() read real_fops->release from freed module memory. Heming also reproduced the issue with fs_state and asked for the other OCFS2 debugfs operation tables to be checked. Set owner to THIS_MODULE in all eleven explicit debugfs operation tables: five in ocfs2_nodemanager, four in ocfs2_dlm, and two in ocfs2. The existing debugfs get/put pair then holds the appropriate module until final release. Leave the open, read and release callbacks unchanged. The blockcheck table already sets owner through DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(), so it needs no change. The original controlled test used an unloadable OCFS2 module and case-local probe filters without changing the candidate open, unload or release logic. Closing a retained connected_nodes file after normal unload produced: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff804cfef Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:full_proxy_release+0xbf/0x190 Call Trace: <TASK> __fput+0x39a/0xa60 fput_close_sync+0xff/0x200 __x64_sys_close+0x8c/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Modules linked in: [last unloaded: ocfs2_nodemanager]