Fedora Account System
Red Hat Associate
Red Hat Customer
A client can enforce a minimum authentication level (the "Minimum ACR Value" client setting, documented as the server-side way to enforce step-up authentication). The normal authorization endpoint applies that minimum, so the second factor is demanded. The credential reset endpoint (/realms/{realm}/login-actions/reset-credentials?client_id=...&redirect_uri=...) also creates a login session for a client. That session never receives the client's required level. A user who starts the login there and follows the "Back to login" link gets the same login form. Because no level is required, the conditional second-factor subflow is skipped and the login completes with the first factor only. Keycloak then issues an authorization code, and the client can redeem it for an access token and a refresh token. The token carries the level the first factor reached (acr=1). The same defect was fixed for the Device Authorization Grant and CIBA in 26.8.2 (CVE-2026-105305). This is a further entry point with the same missing step. The same omission exists when a login is continued from an action token link (password reset, verify email or execute-actions email), but that path needs a valid action token and is narrower. Against the built-in administration console, whose minimum ACR is set to a second-factor level, an attacker who knows only an administrator's password obtains a token that works against the Admin API. This also relies on the missing PKCE enforcement at the token endpoint on the same entry point, which is tracked separately in keycloak/keycloak#55064.