Fedora Account System
Red Hat Associate
Red Hat Customer
A flaw was found in Quay's robot credential verification path. In data/model/user.py, verify_robot() treats a JWT-shaped password as a robot credential and calls verify_robot_jwt_token(), which checks mainly signature, sub, and aud. Registry bearer tokens minted by /v2/auth for a robot do not carry api_scopes; auth/credentials.py therefore does not take the robot API JWT path and falls through to verify_robot(). As a result, a Quay-signed registry JWT whose sub is the robot is accepted as that robot's password. An attacker who obtains a scoped, short-lived registry JWT (for example pull-only on one repository, via CI log or config.json exposure) can authenticate as the full robot, request broader registry scopes the robot is already entitled to, and continue minting fresh tokens via /v2/auth. Regenerating the robot's stored password does not revoke this path; access ends when the robot is deleted, the owner is disabled, or the robot's repository permissions are removed. This was reproduced locally: a pull-only registry JWT used as basic-auth password successfully reminted a push+pull token, and the same JWT continued to work after robot password regeneration while the old password returned 401.