Description of problem:

Raphael Marichez of Gentoo reported an insecure temporary file usage flaw in
QGit. (see URL for original report)

The following code in dataloader.cpp is problematic:

220 bool DataLoader::doStart(SCList args, SCRef wd) {
221 
222         // ensure unique names for our DataLoader instance file
223         dataFileName = "/qgit_" + QString::number((ulong)this) + ".txt";
224         scriptFileName = "/qgit_" + QString::number((ulong)this) + ".sh";
225 
226         // create a script to redirect 'git rev-list' stdout to dataFile
227         QDir dir("/tmp"); // use a tmpfs mounted filesystem if available
228         bool foundTmpDir = (dir.exists() && dir.isReadable());
229         scriptFileName.prepend(foundTmpDir ? "/tmp" : wd);
230         dataFileName.prepend(foundTmpDir ? "/tmp" : wd);

Not only does QGit construct a predictable file name here, and doesn't check if
the files already exist, which can be leveraged into information leak or
arbitrary file overwrite in case they're symlinks, but later on executes one of
them. This is not just problem when /tmp is mounted with noexec option, but
might be exploited into arbitrary code execution under time-dependent race
condition.

With this said, please update as possible.

Additional information:

There's no CVE identifier for this issue. I will request one soon.

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):

qgit-1.5.6-1.fc7